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EU Enlargement: From a Success Story to Fatigue 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the prospect of European Union (EU) enlargement as a crucial 
step in the context of “enlargement fatigue”. It reviews the enlargement process in the 
post-2000s. From the late 1950 onwards, the idea of European unification has gradually 
been emphasized by an attempt to bring peace and stability. Between 1957 and 1995, the 
EU grew from six to fifteen members. The high point of this development was reached in 
2004 and 2007, with an inclusion of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), 
who had the communist traditions. After a decade of difficult economic and political 
reforms, the applicant countries finally edged toward centre stage. Since then, the debate 
has focused on the question of whether enlargement is fundamental to European unity and 
how far new member states can contribute to European integration and share the Unin’s 
benefits. The study relies on the key findings from the European Commission and the 
number of independent studies in this field. The study draws upon interpretative models in 
the existing literature. 
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AB Genişlemesi: Bir Başarı Öyküsünden Yorgunluğa 
Öz 
 Bu çalışma “genişleme yorgunluğu” bağlamında önemli bir adım olarak gelecek 
Avrupa Birliği (AB) genişleme ihtimalini incelemektedir. Çalışma 2000'li yıllarda 
genişleme sürecini gözden geçirmektedir. 1950’lerin sonlarından beri Avrupa’nın 
bütünleştirilmesi fikri aşamalı olarak Avrupa’ya barış ve istikrar getirmesi çabaları 
çerçevesinde değerlendirilmiştir. 1957’den 1995’e kadar AB üye sayısını 6’dan 15’e 
çıkarmıştır. 2004 ve 2007’lerde komünist geçmişe sahip Orta ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinin 
katılmalarıyla bu gelişmenin doruk noktasına ulaşılmıştır. 10 yıllık zorlu politik ve 
ekonomik reformlardan sonra, üyeliğe başvuran aday ülkeler sonuçta merkezi aşamaya 
ulaştılar. O zamandan beri, tartışma genişlemenin AB için zorunlu olup olmadığı, yeni üye 
ülkelerin Avrupa entegrasyonuna ne kadar katkıda bulunabilecekleri ve faydalarını 
paylaşabilecekleri  sorusu üzerine odaklanmıştır. Çalışma, Avrupa Komisyonu ve bu 
alanda bir çok sayıdaki bağımsız çalışmalardan elde edilen anahtar bulgulara 
dayanmaktadır. Çalışma literatürde yer alan yorumsal modeller üzerinde durmaktadır. 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Avrupa Birliği, Koşullar, Genişleme, Entegrasyon 
JEL Sınıflandırma Kodları: F53, F55  
                                                 
1 Assistant Prof. Dr., Giresun University, Department of Economy, G.Oguz@pgr. 
reading.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Gönül OĞUZ 
82 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In June 1993, the European Council in Copenhagen explicitly established 
the accession of the CEECs as an EU objective. The Copenhagen Council 
required the candidate countries to achieve ‘stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and 
protection of minorities’ and ‘the existence of a functioning market 
economy’.2 They must accept the aims of political, economic, and monetary 
union as stated in the Treaty on European Union (Schimmelfennig 2001: 5). 
Under Article 49 of the EU's treaties, any European country that respects for 
European values, as mentioned above, may apply for membership of the 
EU. While this does not mean automatic acceptance, it clearly leaves the 
right of initiative with the interested states.3  
The EU’s enlargement policy was enshrined in the Treaty on European 
Union of 1992 and typically presumes the legitimate aspiration of European 
citizens to join the endeavour of a unified Europe. The Treaty aimed ‘to 
promote economic and social progress, which is balanced and sustainable, 
in particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, 
through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion’ (European 
Commission 1992: 23). Simply, this is a reflection of ‘maintaining in full 
the acquis communautaire’, 
The EU has been tightly linked to the question of enlargement. From its 
inception in the 1950s, the Union has experienced a series of enlargements. 
In 1973, countries joined the EC: the UK, Denmark and Ireland. This was 
followed by three accessions: Greece joined in 1981, and Spain and 
Portugal in 1986. The next enlargement was in 1995 with the accession of 
                                                 
2 Presidency Conclusions Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993,  
  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf 
3 EurActive, Future Enlargement: Absorption Capacity Coming to the Fore? 23 March  
 2006 http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/future-enlargement 
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Austria, Finland and Sweden. In 2004, eight CEE countries; the Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
and Cyprus and Malta joined the EU. The membership size has grown to 27, 
with the most recent expansion of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.  
The most recent EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 have fuelled a 
discussion of enlargement fatigue in the EU, with possible negative 
consequences for the membership chances of Turkey, Croatia and other 
Balkan countries. The accession negotiations are currently underway with 
Turkey, Iceland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and 
Montenegro. At the moment, there are accession talks with Turkey and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Other countries expressed long 
term EU aspirations. At the same time, the applications from other 
countries, for example Ukraine and Georgia can be anticipated.  
 
2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON EU ENLARGEMENT 
In mapping the original understanding of EU enlargement, the entire 
range of theoretical approaches have been developed and put forward for 
analyzing integration in the member states since 1960s. These studies 
correspond to building blocks for a theory of European integration. In the 
past, many prominent theorists and commentators have cast doubt on the 
worth of debate about the process of integration. This is because the theories 
of European integration are disputed concepts. Most studies claim that 
European integration is a set of beliefs about the nature of the member states 
and where the process is going today is the fundamental issue in terms of 
political debate. A condition of political, social and economic circumstances 
is that they are subject to change as steps forward. Therefore, the usual 
assumption is that the theorizing European integration has moved on 
significantly from early approaches. 
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Hence, the study of European enlargement is dominated by the 
competing approaches. In the first period of European integration, 
neofunctionalism was often used as a term of spillover.  This is largely for 
historical reasons, as neofunctionalism was the first attempt at theorizing the 
new form of regional co-operation that emerged after the Second World 
War (Cini 2003: 81). It is important to note that, neofunctionalism appears 
to be winning the theoretical debate. The theory sought to explain how and 
why states voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with one another, while 
acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves. There 
are four key parts to the neofunctionalist argument: 
• The concept of the “state” is more complex than realists suggested. 
• The activies of interest groups and bureaucratic actors are not 
confined to the domestic political arena. 
• Non-state actors are important in international politics. 
• European integration is advanced through “spillover” pressures 
(Bache and George 2006: 16). 
From this viewpoint, the question of defining the limits to the EU 
enlargement seems an underlying issue. Historically, once the EU went 
ahead and enlarged itself, neofunctionalism might have incorporated this 
fact within its calculations, for example, with regard to the impact of greater 
interest diversity on transnational group formation or the likelihood that the 
sheer increase in members would have an effect upon the promotional role 
of the European Commission. In both cases, as well as other possible 
examples, the prediction is seemingly straightforward: enlargement 
attenuates and delays the probability of spill-over-unless such a spill-over in 
task or authority is built into the negotiations surrounding the accession 
process as a means of compensating existing members or accommodating 
the new ones (Wiener and Diez 2004: 70). Yet, this apparent complexity of 
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bargaining framework should not obscure the the compliance of the member 
states with the EU norms and regulations, which offer the applicant 
countries rewards, as they contribute more to European integration.  
In the case of the EU enlargement, the most important argument about 
neo- functionalism is that the rise of new Europe delays and even slows 
down the enlargement impact. That’s why, the spill-over effect of the 
negotiation process prior to full membership should be put forward and 
compensation of the member states as well as the candidate countries  for 
damages should be the basic requirement (Kutay 2008: 152). 
Some studies acknowledge that there is no link between both 
functionalism and neofunctionalism with enlargement. According to 
Schmitter (2004), both approaches have remained silent about the 
enlargement phenomenon. Neofunctionalism particularly focused on the 
issue of whether new member states can provide full compliance with the 
acquis and transfor the necessary authority to a supranational body as a 
result of successful negotiations (Schmitter 2004: 70-71). Quite apart from 
this, neofunctionalism has stressed the long term effect of enlargement on 
the acquis. This is despite the fact that no similar emphasis can be found 
regarding the option of opting out long derogations and some common 
policies. 
Along this line, a new “intergovermentalist” school of integration was 
developed in response to the neofunctionalist analysis of European 
integration. Hoffmann (1966) claimed influentially that the EU member 
governments played the central role in the historical development of the EU 
rather than international organizations (Hoffmann, 1966). Hoffmann’s 
argument here is, in some measure, critical to the extent of which he 
discerned the development of the global international system in the light of 
changes in the global economic situation since the early 1970s. Moreover, 
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the process of European integration is shaped by the national governments 
that are uniquely powerful actors in the pace of integration. However, the 
debate about the unique nature of national governments still leaves us to 
address the matter of how far the member states can avoid to protect and 
promote the national interests. Basically, co-operation in the area of “high 
politics”, such as national security and defence is limited as a justification 
for promoting the national interests.  
According to Rosamond (2000), one of the theories that explain EU’s 
depenening and widening process as well as the revision of the treaties is 
intergovernmentalism. To a larger extent, the enlargement decision is the 
outcome of intergovernmental negotiations generated by a unanimous 
decision. Although the theory of intergovernmentalism does not base on an 
empirical study of enlargement issue, much of work by Mattli (1999) and 
Gstöhl (2002) have focused on membership of candidate countries. 
However, the analysis of the EU’s approach to enlargement has largely been 
neglected (Schimmelfennig, 2004). 
Moravcsik (1993) argued that the changing face of intergovenmentalism 
could be seen in the EU’s treaties including the 1957 Treaty of Rome and 
the 1992 Treaty on European Union. These treaties were not driven 
primarily by the supranational entrepreneurs from the early integration, but 
rather by a gradual process of preference convergence among the most 
powerful member states. In this regard, much of the reasoning behind the 
theory of intergovernmentalism derives from the idea of liberalism. In the 
mid-1980s, as the integration process was speed up, there was a revival of 
the theoretical debate. Such a process could, as Moravcsik has pointed out, 
only be continued effectively when powers and preferences of the EU 
member states were revised in the context of intergovernmental model. On 
the wole, Moravcsik offers mitigating circumstances in which the theories 
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of European integration should be supplemented by more general theories of 
national responses to international independence. Therefore, an emphasis is 
placed on the institutional transfer of competence by the member states. By 
doing so, the member states are more likely to contribute to further 
integration pointing to a real surrender of sovereignty (Wallace et al 2005). 
During the 1990s, liberal intergovernmentalism emerged as arguably the 
leading theory of European integration, yet its basic theoretical assumptions 
were questioned by the international relations scholars coming from two 
different directions. A first group of scholars, collected under the fabrics of 
rational choice and historical institutionalism, accepted Moravcsik’s 
rationalist assumptions, but rejected his spare institution-free model of 
intergovernmental bargaining as an accurate description of the EU policy 
process. By contrast, a second school of thought, drawing from sociological 
institutionalism and constructivism, raised more fundamental objections to 
the methodological individualism of rational choice theory in favour of an 
approach in which national preferences and identities were shaped, at least 
in part, by the EU norms and rules (Wallace et al 2005: 19).  
By now, it is clear that the general theme of enlargement conditionality 
requires the applicant countries to demonstrate a pattern of cooperation and 
underlying a set of attitudes. One may easily assume that 
intergovernmentalism is disputed, but undeniably potent idea of the 
European integration. Across the member states, political passions are 
continuously excited by the call of supranationalism. A team of scholar led 
by Wayne Sandholtz and Stone Sweet in 1997 offered an alternative cut 
through the dichotomy. Fundamental to this approach was the argument that 
if the EU was to be analysed as an international regime, as Moravcsik 
insisted, it could be, then it had to be seen not as a single regime, but as a 
series of regimes for different policy sectors. Therefore, Sandholtz and 
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Sweet sought to explain the different levels of supranationalism that existed 
in different policy sectors. The three key elements in their approach were 
the development of transnational society, the role of supranational 
organizations with meaningful autonomous capacity to pursue integrative 
agenda, and a focus on European rule-making to resolve what they called 
‘supranational policy externalities’ (Sandholtz and Sweet 1997: 76).  
Applying federalism to the enlargement logic, some commentator argue 
that the integration of different entities is far more important than 
assimilating them in the EU, while acknowledging difference and diversity. 
As Wiener and Diez rightly assumed (2004), previously discrete, distinct, or 
independent entities come together to form a new whole-a union-in (Wiener 
and Diez 2004: 29). Obeying the rules and requlations is key to this. So, it is 
easy to figure out which country can join the Union (Schmitter 2004: 73). 
For federalists, the most important reason for the process of enlargement is  
the alignment of the candidate countries without a considerable loss in the 
Union’s acquis and to avoid  interruption of  Europe's ongoing depening 
process, which has been facilitated since 1989 ( Burgess, 1989). 
Given this, the EU may offer a clear indication of what a supranational 
world order might look like. As a matter of fact it sits between the nation 
states and the international system and arguably transforms both through its 
very existence. This is to say, the EU is multidimensional, that integration is 
uneven, that EU governance is composed of multiple, co-existence policy 
modes all force us to think carefully about how the nature of authority is 
changing. The trick is to think about the EU as an internal part of this 
changing pattern of governance.  To treat the EU as a political system 
“above” national political systems ignores the complex interpretation of the 
domestic and the supranational in contemporary Europe (Cini 2007: 73). So, 
the European integration is not easily comprehensible. It is a political 
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phenomenon, which reflects complexity. This is to say, the present vibrant 
theoretical culture in European studies leads to confusion in a reasonably 
sophisticated way. 
These complex considerations are not only of theoretical interests, but 
also reflections of the cost benefit balance. There is no doubt that successful 
integration derives from the approximization of the national policies of the 
applicant countries. Essentially, the harmonization process is a key to the 
technical functional sectors. Essentially, an emphasis placed on the role of 
states in international relations. To a certain extent, the enlargement strategy 
is based on the benefits of EU rewards that exceed the domestic adoption 
costs.  
 
3. THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS 
3.1 The Fall of Communism 
 In 1989, the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
promoted a flood of requests to help the citizens of CEE to transform their 
economies and politics. In many former Communist states, the demise of the 
old regimes was accompanied by calls for a “return to Europe”, which found 
concrete expression in formal requests to join the European Community 
(EC) (Wallace 2005: 19).  During this period, Gorbachev reforms were 
virtually non-existent–transcended the political landscape between the EC 
and the CEECs. At the same time, the challenges for the EC itself were 
gradually emerging, when CEECs faced the reality of adjusting themselves 
in the post-1989 Europe. In fact, the European Political Co-operation (EPC) 
was a rare and positive experience; it quickly gave rise to the forms of light 
co-operation and communication. The individual partnership and co-
operation agreements aside, the new détente under Gorbachev was seen as 
tentative attempts to establish “more normal” relations, most notably Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) declaration of 1988. 
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 On the one hand, Western Europeans found themselves in a quandary. 
They saw membership as the best way of assisting the former Communist 
states of the CEE, in order to make the transition to liberal democracy and 
the market economy. Following the Madrid summit in December 1995, 
enlargement was regarded as ‘both a political necessity and an historic 
opportunity for Europe’ (White et al 2002: 137). On the other hand, the 
institutional structure of the EU was the main attraction for the successive 
CEE governments, which would provide the commitment to the principles 
of democracy, pluralism and the rule of law. 
 For the economic logic, the EU was regarded as a strong platform to 
implement economic reforms. In the context of the Cold war, the Rhodes 
European Council in December 1988 indicated that the European integration 
project did not accelerate conflict, but rather sought to end the division in 
the continent. By doing so, such a project defended market economies (as 
well as liberal democracies) in Europe. As the need to change became a real 
issue, the Strasbourg European Council in December 1989 pledged a full 
support for transformation in the CEECs as a further step.  
Generally, more coordinated Western policy was crucial under the 
leadership of the European Commission, which would promote systematic 
transformation in the CEECs. Such a policy had important implications for 
the outlook of political and economic reforms within the context of 
enlargement process of the CEECs. The credit was high, when the 
Commission developed bilateral Trade and Co-operation Agreements 
(TCAs) with the individual countries. Further political mandate was given to 
the Commission to coordinate aid with other international organizations and 
agencies, the Western Industrialized countries (G24) were created as a result 
of the G7 Summit in July 1989. The Commission undertook a leading role 
with the intention of a “framework for action” on behalf of the EC. 
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Consequently, the Commission submitted its own Action Plan, which was 
already a clear indication of increasingly combative confidence. The aim 
was to create an incentive for other members of the G24 to take similar and 
coordinated initiatives.4  
Much of the rhetoric of these attempts contained fully conscious of the 
common responsibility. Obviously, a special role was assigned to the EU to 
support transformations in the CEECs. However, a range of emerging 
intensity of interests, particularly among the bigger member states made it 
more difficult to perform such a role. This related to a perceived desirability 
and the need to re-establish historic ties in the region. For example, the 
French and the British governments were increasingly more concerned 
about German influence in the CEECs following the German unification in 
1990. Apparently, there was no general agreement on precisely how the 
spirit of co-operation should be achieved.  Most crucially of all, some 
anxiety had been arisen from particularly from the unilateral activities of the 
bigger states, which could create tensions within the EU. Consequently, a 
truly EU-wide shared interest in geopolitical stabilization of the region was 
the main requirement for the long-term political and economic 
developments. In this respect, coordination was seen as a reassuring way 
forward. Here, the key role of the EU should not be underestimated, which 
would later become the political rationale. 
 Still, there was much concern regarding the core values of European 
integration, as the new CEE governments would frame their goals of 
reforms, with the explicit references to the European identity. The new 
democracies were – albeit fragile – undertaking a crippling overload of 
implementing changes, dealing with tight economic as well as specific 
                                                 
4 The Action Plan included measures such as the improvement of market access for the 
emergency of humanitarian aid and the provision of macroeconomic assistance, in order to 
set up the Community’s own programme for technical assistance–the Phare programme. 
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political conditions. The extensive tests of their ‘ability were to assume the 
obligations of membership’ (Pridham 2002: 953), which were mainly 
consisted of the appropriate administrative and judicial structures. Unlike 
the previous accessions, the significance of the EU’s role was largely 
beyond the external demand and expectation. There was no pretence. 
Simply, the principle foreign policy aim was to join Europe via becoming a 
member of the Union. To a lesser extent, this interest repeatedly was fuelled 
by the US administration because it was no longer playing a greater role in 
European affairs. Once German unification was under way, there were 
naturally more general supports for the EU membership.   
It is possible to suggest that this rhetoric put a strong emphasis on the 
finalite politique of economic co-operation and assistance, but seemed to 
fall short to provide the fruitful results. It was certainly not easy task to 
achieve what was previously set up. Even so, there was a fairly pervasive 
commitment to the principles of the EPC by CEECs, which eased the 
political conditionality, to a lesser extend. Neverthless, the policy responses 
of the CEECs were ad hoc. Surely, a more determined approach would be 
essential to coordinate political (as well as economic) transformation in the 
CEECs closely within the EPC framework. This complication stemmed 
from the critical period of Communist regime. From the perspective of 
enlargement process, the EU was not prepared for the unexpected change, 
which was under time pressure and uncertainty about the speed of reforms 
and durability. One paradox for this is that the shortages of staff and 
expertise in the CEECs. At the technical level, a lack of policy blueprints for 
appropriate responses was also the case. It is perhaps not surprising that 
efficiency was not always evident, especially in relation to some of  the 
innovative elements for, at the very least, the sake of delivering economic 
results.  
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 3.2 Europe Agreements 
 During the 1990s, challenge was how to ensure a degree of “political 
significance” of the latest enlargement. With some joy of movement 
towards more long-term relations with the CEECs, the EU member states 
(i.e., the UK or the German government) demonstrated a positive response 
to further enlargement. They frequently renewed upon their commitments to 
more coherent and strategic policies. At the same time, an explicit 
controversy amongs the policy-makers, who were nervous about opening up 
potentially divisive debate about future EU integration model. 
Consequently, debate between two strands was called the “widening versus 
deepening” that dominated new geopolitical balance in Europe. 
 Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the EC acted promptly to support 
the transition process. In the initial phase, the EU granted the CEE countries 
for the preferential tariff treatment within the framework of the Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP). They were soon replaced by the Europe 
Agreements (EAs), aimed at introducing free trade between the EC and the 
associated countries (Putten 2002: 85). In 1990, the outcome of a special 
meeting of the European Council was the agreement that would set up a 
multilateral political dialogue. This was to ‘create a new type of association 
agreement as part of the new pattern of relationships in Europe’. In 1991, 
this decision reflected on the balance of opinions derived from the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which gave the priority to deepening 
rather than widening. The EC policy-makers found it convenient to address 
the CEECs as an “external” problem (Sedelmeier and Wallace 2000: 436). 
The EAs were to soon introduce great benefits. In particularly, the 
agreements included the most advanced countries, notably Hungary, Poland 
and Czechoslovakia. They were mirrored in subsequent negotiations over 
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transformation strategies and requirements for external supports concerning 
economic, political and social reforms in CEECs. 
 It is easy to see potential relevance in the acceptance of EAs formula. 
This was made especially clear during the EA negotiations. Instead of 
offering generous trade concessions, EAs formula was arguably seen as 
most appropriate market needs of the CEECs. The cross-cutting cleavages 
emerged in the defence of sectoral interests from steel to potatoes in 
resistance to the large-scale financial transfers to the CEECs. Quite apart 
from this, some EU-15 countries were most concerned about stability in the 
region (i.e., Germany) used the segmented nature of EU decision-making to 
their advantage and opposed significant financial support to the region, 
despite their earlier support at the highest political levels for the transition. 
As a result, the trade provisions of the EAs were sharply criticised as being 
too restrictive (Friis and Murphy 1999: 75). The constraints were also more 
evident, where the gap between CEECs expectations and concrete proposals 
from the EU became obvious. In this sense, the EAs provided a real 
dissatisfaction to slow the pace of transitional advance for most CEECs. For 
example, the Polish delegation refused to send a high-level delegation for 
negotiations. This action led to two periods of deadlock, first in late March 
1991, and again in July 1991. It should also be noted that a systematic 
antagonism on both sides entailed only limited relationship prior to 1989. 
The centrally planned economies did not engage much in foreign trade, 
although the development of bilateral relations had been a priority in the 
1980s. The links were still in their infancy, when the Cold War ended.  
To reiterate, the economic substance of the EAs fell short of the CEECs 
expectations within the context of trade liberalization and financial 
assistance, despite the EC committed itself to the free trade in industrial 
products for several years in principle. Not surprisingly, the EAs offered 
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slower and limited liberalization. Concern of this kind meant that the EU 
activities were limited for the purpose of protecting the sensitive sectors, 
such as coal, steel, agriculture and textiles, which remained outside the 
framework of the EAs protocols and annexes. Such sectors were accounted 
for the bulk of the CEECs exports as their medium-term comparative 
advantages. Although the objective would eventually be achieved through 
means of liberalization, the EC producers chose further provisions for a 
contingent protection. This triggered an economic commitment to defer 
potential foreign investors.  
Forging the fragile compromise, most EU leaders thought that they 
reached a broad membership aspiration, but learnt the shortcomings in the 
implementation of the EAs. The Eastern enlargement began with the scale 
and difficulties. There was a gradually decreasing public support for the 
vigorous reforms. At the same time, the EU was heavily influenced by the 
public opinion to use the instruments of commercial protection. 
Consequently, a trade surplus with the CEECs became harder to avoid. The 
gap between the EU rhetoric and substance should not be overstated, but 
neither should it be dismissed. This implies that the opening of the European 
labour markets to the CEECs was a long term prospect. For that reason, a 
new strategy was necessary to focus on assisting these countries for their 
new situations.    
3.3 Deciding on a Wider Membership 
 Since 1989, the EU membership has seen as a consistent priority for the 
CEECs. This is because joining the EU was regarded as an astonishing 
development only a few years after the disappearance of the major symbols 
of the East-West dichotomy – including the Berlin Wall (Virkkunen 2001: 
141). The EC was originally devised to be a dynamic organisation with 
flexible institutional relations: it was not the end-point in the process of 
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European integration, but the beginning (Holand 2004: 158). The legal and 
technical procedures for enlargement were uncomplicated, but the political 
barriers were far more difficult to overcome. In June 1993, the Copenhagen 
European Council specified the EU membership condition for the new 
accession countries ‘that so desire shall become members of the European 
Union’ as follows: 
‘Membership requires that the candidate county has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes 
the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the 
aims of political, economic and monetary union’ (European Council, 1993). 
 Accordingly, each candidate country must adopt the EU’s acquis 
communautaire - the entire body of the EU laws and policies. To complete 
the accession process, each applicant must negotiate 31 sectoral chapters of 
the acquis such topics as free movement of goods, competition policy, and 
the environment. In addition, the candidate country must continue domestic 
reforms, in particular the strengthening of their administrative and judicial 
structures, so that they can effectively implement and enforce the acquis 
(Guth 2001: 22).  
  In December 1994, this overall policy saw the emergence of a pre-
accession strategy for the CEECs at the European Council in Essen. In 
effect, this strategy was a one-sided adjustment programme which outlined 
many of the key tasks to be undertaken, in order to secure membership. 
Prescriptions for the EU preparations were restricted to policy and 
budgetary reviews, while the institutional implications would be tackled in 
the (then) forthcoming 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (Friis, and 
Murphy 1999: 222). In June 1994, the European Commission report on the 
strategy already revealed more engagement of policy towards the CEECs at 
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the Corfu European Council, with the aim of preparing these countries for 
accession. There were clear indications of initiatives of the 1985 
Commission White Paper on the Single Market. This made implicit 
assumptions on the capacity of the CEECs to adopt the EU market 
regulations. The main aim was to build a strategy to align with EU 
legislation. On varying scales, a range of innovation was employed to 
increase the alignment. Such an alignment related to the economic 
restructuring, in order to facilitate internationalization of the CEEC 
economies. This regulatory alignment included many areas (i.e., agriculture) 
aimed at the effective use of the Phare programme,5 limit the use of 
commercial defence instruments and improvement of trade opportunities 
through liberalization. On the political front, it was expected that deepening 
the political dialogue would allow a significant participation of the CEECs’ 
governments in the second and third pillars of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).  
On a similar vein, the European Commission White Paper on regulatory 
alignment was agreed at the Cannes European Council in June 1995. By 
doing so, an extensive effort was made to provide more economic aid to the 
CEECs or improve aid package. In December 1995, the Madrid Summit 
moved one step further to enlargement. The Summit agreed to begin the 
preparatory phase of accession negotiations following the end of the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). However, the tension between 
maintaining the EU governance system – contributing the overall security 
order in Europe – and containing the internal costs of enlargement 
resurfaced in Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s trail balloon at the summit. The aim 
                                                 
5 Phare Programme aimed at the accession countries, in order to improve their economic 
and financial well-being. Having said that, the countries of CEE) were the main beneficies 
of the Phare within the context of the EU’s the pre-accession strategy. Since 1994, the 
priorities and needs of each CEECs have become more important than other accession 
countries. 
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was to limit the promise to the “avant garde” of Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic (Financial Times 1995: 8). Nonetheless, these initiatives 
were at their speediest in relation to the pre-accession strategy.  
It should also be noted that the EU-15 member states were concerned 
with fostering negative attitudes for the accession process from the outset. 
This was believed to be central to weaken incentives and render the entire 
negotiation process. Perhaps the best indication of this was “favouritism” 
for some applicants of whom individual EU member states had geographical 
and historical ties. Given well-known position of German governments on 
some issues, the UK was inclined to regard the enlargement process as a 
treat to the coherence of the EU – especially if it involved with Turkish 
membership. However, the UK obstacle was at least partly removed by the 
outcome of 1997 general election. In spite of this, many of the more 
important internal EU changes needed to accommodate CEECs – notably 
reform of the CAP and of the Structural Funds (Nugent 2003: 105).  
No matter whether an increased membership would generate both 
management problems and a greater heterogeneity, the IGC tried to 
facilitate a more flexible model of integration. In this context, any 
shortcomings of the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on 2 October 1997, could 
be compensated. What was more crucial was that the EU should be careful 
not to weaken the basis for the establishment of ‘Freedom, Security and 
Justice Area’, as the Treaty envisaged. As regards to common entry rules, 
the free movement of persons was particularly relevant. It was stressed that 
any shortcomings on these issues would be reversed by co-operation.  
Eventually, the European Commission revealed its opinion, which was 
ambitiously entitled Agenda 2000 on the candidates. It was a framework of 
enlargement strategy including the effect of enlargement on internal policies 
and a proposed new financial perspective (2000-2006). It soon became 
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obvious that bringing stability to the EU was a difficult task, although it was 
expected that enlargement would create opportunities for ensuring peace in 
Europe and accessing new market. 
 To elaborate this point further, the publication of the Commission’s 
Agenda 2000 provided a clearer picture of how the EU would proceed with 
enlargement process. The Commission proposed that enlargement 
negotiations should be opened with five CEECs (the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia) and Cyprus. The opinions were 
organized in sections examining the ability of the applicants to meet 
Copenhagen criteria. The increased emphasis was placed on the ability of 
candidates to meet the conditions in the medium term. Only those five 
CEECs were recommended by the Commission for an early accession 
negotiation. Some policy-makers argued against differentiation and for the 
“regatta” option; all of the candidates should start the accession race, but 
row at different speeds towards the finishing-line, depending on the pace of 
their convergence with the EU and the success of their domestic reforms 
(Wallace 2005: 18).    
 In March 1998, the EU began accession negotiations with the six 
applicant countries mentioned above, following their adaptation, 
implementation and the application of the acquis. Through these stages, the 
applicant countries were expected to meet their obligations, as set out in the 
EU treaties. During the Summit meetings in Finland and Helsinki in 
December 1999, the accession negotiation was openned with Slovakia, 
Romania, Malta, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Latvia. Although Turkey was 
recognised as a candidate country, its application was to be assessed on the 
basis of the same criteria. In December 2002, the Copenhagen European 
Council concluded accession talks with ten countries: the Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Malta, Slovakia and 
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Slovenia. They acceded to the EU on 1 May, 2004, following the signing of 
the accession treaty on 1 April, 2003.  On 1 January, 2007, the EU’s 
integration capacity included two additional countries: Bulgaria and 
Romania. The inclusion of the CEECs completed the Big Bang enlargement 
to 27. 
From the perspective of the late 2000s, the expansion of the EU to 27 or 
more member states raises questions about the way in which the Union has 
traditionally managed the enlargement process and whether this is an 
appropriate framework for the future. The wide claims sometimes made for 
the optimism: enlargement can be a catalyst for solving some of Europe’s 
outstanding problems, and thus convincing the EU leaders to make a leap 
forward. Such an optimism goes some way in explaining the refocusing on 
the EU strategy by considering the situation of the enlarged EU. This 
necessitates looking ahead the future situation where the EU should launch a 
new enlargement strategy to overcome fatigue. 
 
4. ENLARGEMENT FATIGUE 
The controversy over the EU’s capacity for continued enlargement brings 
into question whether the EU can take in new members without jeopardizing 
the political and policy objectives established in the treaties. It also raises 
the question of whether or not continued enlargement can still be one of 
EU’s main goals (Sundell and Karlsson 2010). The functioning capacity of 
the Union are more likely be retained in the future, unless necessary reforms 
are not launched. An unlimited enlargement of the EU-27 may not only 
seriously endanger the ability of institutions to function, but the efficiency 
of decision-making processes in the EU.  
Hence, an emphasis has placed on the question of whether more states 
can be integrated into the EU. Having completed its biggest and most 
significant enlargement round, voices arose in the EU claiming that a halt in 
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further enlargements was necessary. Since the most recent enlargement in 
2007, the question has again arisen as to whether this marks a break or even 
the end of the enlargement policy pursued by the EU so far. For now, there 
is no real consensus on where the EU’s ultimate borders lie and if an EU 
with 30 or 35 member states could still function efficiently (Devrim and 
Schulz 2009: 3). 
A focus is on the overall identity of Europe that is what the EU stands for 
and where “Europe” ends. There are many divisions and differences based 
on language, political ideologies or religious background between the old 
EU, new member states and the applicant countries. Especially, diversities 
in the context of geography, history, and culture make the applicant 
countries distinct. It is necessary to take into account the difference in the 
approach of membership of Turkey. The admission of Turkey with an 
Islamic culture is perceived as vastly different and incompatible with 
Europe. This is one of the reasons for generally negative attitute towards 
enlargement. However, the Treaty of Roma of 1957 stated that ‘any 
European State may apply to become a member of the Community’ (Article 
237), but no clear definition of “Europe” was given. It is not surprising that 
voices have been raised against further expansion, in particular to include 
Turkey since the enlargement 2004. As claimed, the defeat of the European 
Constitutional Treaty in the 2005 French and Dutch referendums was partly 
due to a backlash against the idea of Turkish membership.6 While Turkey’s 
accession affects the fulfillment of the EU conditionality, it is difficult to 
figure out whether other applicant countries, notably Ukraine or those of the 
Southern Caucasus should be considered as part of Europe.  
                                                 
6 Euromove Future Enlargement of the EU, January 2009,    
http://www.euromove.org.uk/index.php?id=6502 
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A successful integration requires peacefull solution to political crises. A 
particular question arises as to whether there will be a political solution to 
the conflict over Cyprus within the context of enlargement fatique. This is 
indispensable, as often stated by the EU officials, but not a precondition. 
Priory to it accession to the EU, the reality was more complex because 
Greece would block future enlargements if Cyprus was excluded.  Twin 
referendums on United Nations plan to reunify the Island were held on 24 
April, 2004. Approximately, 65% of Turkish Cypriot voters in the North 
approved the plan, but 76% of Greek Cypriot voters in the South rejected it 
(Archick and Morelli 2008: 4). On the one hand, the EU is cautious on the 
Cyprus issue. On the other hand, the Southern Greek Cypriot benefits 
greatly from the EU financial aids. Indeed, the divided Mediterranean Island 
as a whole will likely be better off in the EU. 
Equally important, inclusion of the CEECs into the EU caused some 
anxiety. For instance, corruption in some countries, (most notably Bulgaria 
and Romania) is believed to be endemic and causing restrictions on volume 
of trade as a result of their early access to European labour markets. Like 
any other candidates, the use of strict accession conditions was applied to 
these countries to improve their political and economic situation. However, 
it proved difficult to strengthen their pre-accession strategies. 
Proof of this newly hesitant attitude towards future enlargements is 
provided by the public opinion. According to the Eurobarometer survey in 
2008, almost half of Europeans (48%) believed that the enlargements of 
2004 and 2007 have strengthened the EU, while just over a third of 
Europeans (36%) said that they have weakened the Union (European 
Commission 2008: 62). Interestingly, this sentiment in the old EU was much 
more divided: the only clear majorities in favour of strengthening were in 
Sweden, Spain, Denmark and Greece, and strongly negative were in France, 
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Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria and Germany. The former was reflection of 
widespread appreciation of the political benefits of enlargement across the 
member states and the later negative perceptions of the economic impact on 
the national markets. Usually, economic studies of the impact demonstrate 
that enlargement has been a success story. However, the tendency is that the 
perceptions of European citizens diverge at present from reality.         
 Some EU policy-makers and European publics have long worried about 
the inclusion of new countries with weak economies and low incomes, 
which can prompt the influx of low-cost or unwanted migrant labour. Such 
fears in turn prompted the EU to allow the “old” member states to introduce 
some temporary restrictions on labor migration from those countries that 
joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. Some members states, notably the UK and 
Ireland chose not to impose any transitional restrictions did see an increase 
in workers from the CEECs. Most studies since 2004 suggest that the 
migration flows from the CEECs has been relatively small. Such migrants 
have not displaced local workers or significantly driven down local wages 
(Emerson et al 2006: 4).  
According to the Office for National Statistics, although numbers of 
Eastern Europeans have grown in the UK, they still form a comparatively 
small part of the workforce.7 In 2011, there were 106,390 workers – down 
from 158,545 in 2010. Nevertheless, there is still concern, pointing to the 
inclusion of big, relatively less affluent countries, such as Turkey or 
possible Ukraine in the longer term. It is equally important to note that May 
1st 2011 marked the removal of restrictions on the right to work in any 
member state for citizens from the CEECs. All workers from the countries 
that joined the EU in 2004 are now able to take up employment freely in the 
                                                 
7 Office for National Statistics, Migration Statistics Quarterly Report May 2012, Statistical 
Bulletin. 
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EU-15 member states, where labour market restrictions were in place until 
the very end of the seven year transitional period ending April 30th 2011.8  
In part, enlargement fatigue is a reaction to the relative lack of 
democracy in the European institutions. For instance, France has amended 
its constitution to ensure that the French voters would have a say in any 
contemplated future enlargements. Similarly, Austria has indicated that 
before it would vote to admit Turkey into the Union in a referendum. These 
promises were made in an atmosphere in which the polls show that less than 
40 percent of the electorate in Austria, France, Germany, Luxembourg and 
the UK support further enlargement of the Union (Forgue et al 2007: 2). 
The most obvious feature is the weaknesses of the European Parliament and 
the Council of Ministers, given the fact that the term “democracy deficit” is 
closely associated with the capacity of the institutions.  This perceived 
deficit arises from the decision-making mechanisms in the EU. In 
particularly, the European Parliament is not an elected body, and thus is not 
accountable to the electorate. Consequently, the EU citizens have no 
opportunity to vote on whether to expand the Union. 
Equally important, the recent global financial crisis and the present 
difficulties in the Eurozone have highlighted the interdependence of national 
economies both within and beyond the EU. These events underline the 
importance of further consolidating economic and financial stability and 
fostering growth, also in the enlargement countries. The enlargement 
process is a powerful tool to that end (European Commission 2011). The 
inclusion of large countries like Turkey or Ukraine into the European 
mainstream could also have substantial financial consequences for the 
Union’s budget and regional assistance programs, as well as implications for 
                                                 
8 EUbusiness, End of Transitional Arrangements for the Free Movement of Workers, on 30 
April 2011, 29 April 2011. http://www.eubusiness.com/topics/employment/workers-11. 
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the functioning of the EU institutions. The EU member states may fear that 
an ever expanding Union could ultimately weaken their ability to set the 
tone and agenda in EU institutions and to drive EU policies. Moreover, 
doubts persist about the ability of some potential EU aspirants to implement 
EU standards, especially in areas related to the rule of law, fundamental 
rights, and anti-corruption measures (Archick 2012: 10). Additionally, 
enlargement is being blamed for social problems that are more difficult to 
live with (i.e.,unemployment). Anger at the apparent failures of the 
authorities to clamp down on illegal immigration is being directed at the 
enlargement (Wyles, 2009). 
To elaborate this point further, it is often claimed that the EU’s recent 
financial problems and sovereign debt crisis – which have hit the countries 
of the Eurozone particularly hard and caused some observers to doubt the 
future of the EU’s common currency – could potentially slow future rounds 
of EU enlargement. It is also widely claimed that EU leaders are grappling 
not only with trying to remedy the Eurozone’s financial troubles, but also 
with uncertainty about the future direction of the EU itself. As a result, they 
may be less inclined to robustly push forward the enlargement agenda. 
Conversely, the EU’s economic difficulties might make joining the Union – 
and ultimately the common currency – less attractive for some current and 
potential EU candidates. For decades, many countries aspired to join the EU 
largely for the economic benefits that membership would bring. If financial 
instability in the Eurozone persists, however, some aspirants such as Turkey 
– with a rapidly expanding and dynamic economy -may not view the 
benefits of membership as outweighing the potential constraints on its 
sovereignty and national fiscal and monetary policies (Archick and Morelli 
2008: 4).  
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Yet, the well-intentioned half-measures currently being discussed in EU 
circles fail to recognise what is at stake. The offers of partnership, funds or 
trade concessions smack of Europeans fiddling, while their neighbourhood 
burns (Menon 2011). A useful anchor for reform is initiated by the 
European Commission within the context of “the Europe 2020 objectives”. 
Such objectives aim to establish dialogues on economic policy and 
employment, and social policies between the Commission and the applicant 
countries. Precisely, the Europe 2020 is the Union's growth strategy for the 
present decade, guiding it towards becoming a smart, sustainable and 
inclusive economy in a changing world. The applicant countries are 
encouraged to align with the Europe 2020 strategy. This initiative is digital 
agenda for Europe, innovation Union, youth on the move, resource efficient 
Europe, industrial policy for the globalisation era, agenda for new skills and 
jobs, European platform against poverty (European Commission 2011: 4). It 
is also important to note that, as was the case of Easten enlargement, the 
Commission has launched financial assistance programmes towards the 
objectives of Europe 2020, with the aim of socio-economic development 
development of the applicant countries.  
It is perhaps sensible to suggest that there is no way to obscure that 
enlargement has driven the EU’s success. The EU’s capacity to absorb new 
members has proven Union’s most useful and transformative characteristics. 
The democratic and normative conditions to increase integration for the 
potential candidates has driven transformation in Eastern Europe, while new 
members have provided labour, skills, cultural diversity and new languages, 
as well as business and trade opportunities (Devrim and O’Leary 2010: 2). 
As Schimmelfennig (2007) argued, positive political conditionality became 
a general feature of the EU relations with the third countries in the 1990s, it 
has been used less consistently than in EU relations with the potential future 
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member states (Schimmelfennig 2007: 16). In this vein, one little-noticed 
side effect of the Greek debt crisis is that it is playing into the hands of those 
who oppose faster progress on enlarging the Union. Although Balkan states 
are queuing up at the EU’s door, but only Croatia has any chance of 
membership in the next three years. Among the reasons is that Greece – the 
first Balkan state to enter the EC in 1981 – has been exposed as a country 
that ran ruinous and reckless fiscal policies for many years (Barberi 2010). 
Reflecting these or parallel concerns, when the European Council awarded 
the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia the candidate status in 
December 2005, it not only referred to the need for further progress before 
the FYR of Macedonia could join, but also added that ‘the absorption 
capacity of the Union also has to be taken into account’.9  
While focusing on the impact of the future enlargement, on the other 
hand, the EU has a history of stabilizing new democracies in Europe. Many 
fears expressed at the time of successive enlargements (excessive cost and 
stalling the internal development of the enlarged Union etc.) have been 
shown to be unfounded or excessive. Enlargement has proved to be a 
remarkable transformational instrument, consolidating both the transition of 
three authoritarian South European regimes (Greece, Portugal and Spain) 
into democracies, and similarly that of the former Communist countries of 
CEE into market economies and democracies. Thus, the cases of Greece, 
Spain and Portugal in the 1980s, and two decades later, the CEECs illustrate 
how enlargement can be used to entrench democratic reforms and foster 
economic development. This model of stabilization may also be applicable 
for Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine, and even Turkey. This expansion of stabile 
democracy in Europe is a once-in-a-millennium opportunity that citizens of 
                                                 
9 Euromove, Future Enlargement of the EU, January 2009, 
http://www.euromove.org.uk/index.php?id=6502 
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the EU may yet rise to seize.10 Conversely, the EU’s role as anchor in 
international arena should not be underestimated, especially with regard to 
the modernization and democratization process in the CEECs. 
It can be assumed that enlargement, as a concept and a policy, is bringing 
Europe steadily closer to the benefits of lasting peace, stability, democracy, 
shared welfare, human rights and cohesion, it should be recognised and re-
defined as such as soon as possible (Devrim and O’Leary 2010: 2). Article 
49 of the Treaty of Amsterdam sets out conditions and process for any 
European country wishing to become a member of the EU.11 The candidates 
have to fulfil the membership conditions. Under the Treaty of Nice, the EU 
must ensure that its institutions and decision-making process remain 
effective before enlargement.12 It is confirmed that, with the Treaty of 
Lisbon of 2009, European leaders launched a process to make the EU ‘more 
democratic, more transparent and more efficient’.13 As in the case of the 
proposed European Constitution, the Treaty attempts to streamline the EU 
institutions to make the EU-27 member states function effectively.  
As envisaged by the EU treaties, the integration of the CEE over the past 
decade has shown that enlargement benefits the EU as a whole (European 
Commission 2011: 18). Not only has the process of enlargement gone 
smoothly in technical terms, with no failed accession negotiations since 
Britain was vetoed twice by General de Gaulle in the 1960s and no 
insurmountable post-accession problems, it has brought substantial benefits 
                                                 
10 Euromove (2009), “Future Enlargement of the EU”, http://www.euromove.org.uk/index 
11 Official Journal of the European Communities, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
European Union, 24.12.2002. 
12 Official Journal of the European Communities, Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on 
European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related 
Facts  (2001/C 80/01) 10.3.2001. 
13 Official Journal of the European Union Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon 
on13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01. 
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in the way of increased security, stability and prosperity to both new and 
existing member states.14 
If and when EU enlargement is to continue, the EU will need effective 
conditionality in order to get new candidates to reach a level of accession 
preparation to ensure the undisturbed functioning of the internal market and 
the Union’s decision making, and multi-level system of governance 
(Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007: 2).  The countries of the Balkans region 
must now keep up the hard work of democratic and market reforms that will 
allow them to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. The Treaty of Lisbon has 
opened the avenue to this process, but any slowing down of the aspiring 
applicant countries, or diminishing degrees of support in the EU member 
states, would be detrimental to efforts for further stabilizations and 
strengthening of peace in this post-conflict region. Enlargement fatigue is 
not an option. For the continuing EU peace project to succeed and 
encompass the whole of South Eastern Europe, the strong pre-dispositions 
that exist for this project must come to fruition. All the national 
governments in the region have defined their priority in terms of EU 
integration and all have both declared and are now implementing resolution 
of all outstanding issues through peaceful, legal and institutional means 
(Vejvoda, 2010).  
It is equally important to note that future enlargement may be postponed 
until the Union finds ways to reform itself. Having said that, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is emergining as an alternative policy to 
enlargement and is expected to a create positive interdependence with 
neighbouring countries of the East and South.15 This may compensate the 
                                                 
14 Euromove (2009), Future Enlargement of the EU, 
http://www.euromove.org.uk/index.php?id=6502 
15 The ENP was established in 2003 as an option for the EU's neighbouring countries. 
However, there is no real prospects of joining the Union in the foreseeable future.  
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weaknesses of the EU’s ‘Wider Europe’ initiative. Throughout 2003, the 
European Commission had been drafting proposals for a ENP, with the aim 
of enhancing the EU’s relations with sixteen neighbouring states to the East 
and the South by offering ‘more than partnership and less than membership’ 
(European Commission 2003: 23). Simply, as a sustainable incentive for the 
regional cooperation, partnership is seen as an alternative to the EU 
membership. In particularly, the ENP was presented as the Union’s strategic 
response to deal with the new situation following the 2004 enlargement. 
These changing circumstances have led to new rationales i) coping with its 
new external borders and neighbours and ii), finding a solution for a further 
enlargement problem. Both rationales are drawn out of strategic interest 
avoiding potentially damaging consequences on stability and development 
(Boedeltje and Houtum 2011: 130). To put differrently, almost all relevant 
positive consequences of the EU membership could be obtained, in theory at 
least, even without membership of the Union (Chilosi 2005: 1497).16  
Additionally, legitimation of shared European values by the Union’s 
neighbours is crucial, in order to maintain the EU’s influence over the 
neighbourhood without the ability to offer the prospect of membership. The 
discourse of “shared values” establishes a natural link between the EU and 
its neighbours, a link that can exist without formal agreements. European 
neighbours, however, seem currently to lag behind in accepting the EU’s 
normative discourse, rendering the framework inefficient and illegitimate 
(Bogutcaia et al 2006: 127). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Such consequences include integration of non-members into the EU’s economic and 
political area and the support policies. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The study demonstrated that, from the perspective of the late 2000s, the 
expansion of the EU to 27 or more member states raises questions about the 
way in which the Union has traditionally managed the enlargement process 
and whether this is an appropriate framework for the future. The wide 
claims sometimes made for the optimism: enlargement can be a catalyst for 
solving some of Europe’s outstanding problems, and thus convincing the 
EU leaders to make a leap forward. Such optimism goes some way in 
explaining the refocusing on the EU strategy by considering the situation of 
the enlarged EU. This necessitates looking ahead the future situation where 
the EU should launch a new enlargement strategy to overcome fatigue. 
Debate about enlargement is intenified with the inclusion of the CEECs 
into the EU. Here, the public perception should not be underestimated and 
this rests on the EU’s absorbtion capacity to welcome new member states. 
As the study shown, there is a shift in rhetoric about enlargement being a 
success story to a more cautious step forward, with an eye on the public 
opinion. For general public in the EU, the whole machinery is constructed to 
relieve the apprehensions about future enlargement. 
As it was shown, enlargement is reaching its limits and from the cultural 
perspetive at least, the inclusion of countries of “wider Europe” seems 
remote. Much of the opposition towards enlargement is caused by the 
prospect of a large-scale immigrant from new accession countries. It is 
highly likely that migration flows will swap European labour markets and 
strain the welfare systems in the member states.  Again, these complex 
considerations can be tackled by a new enlargement strategy.   
The study emphasized that the length of the negotiations will depend on 
how well the applicant countries are prepared for membership in line with 
pre-accession strategy. The EU enlargement process will more likely to help 
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to accelerate reform and enhance greater stability in the applicant countries. 
At the same time, the candidate countries may create considerable financial 
problems for the EU as a whole. This is true that enlargement will bring less 
prosperous states into the EU, imposing strains on the structural funds. 
Turkey and Ukraine can be viewed in this category, who will more likely to 
join the EU after 2014 – the scheduled date for the beginning of the EU’s 
next budget framework. 
The study concluded that, regardless of these divisions and differences, 
the future enlargement seems a crucial step because it is closely linked to 
the stability and long run prosperity in Europe. This rhetoric in itself should 
be perceived as leap forward to overcome enlargement fatigue and 
accelarate the enlargement process in terms of institutional reform or 
financial support for applicant countries etc. Specifically, the EU should 
offer, at the very least, some of these states the prospect of membership, 
which should unable them to continue along the path of democratisation. In 
fact, enthusiasm for a strict sense of adherence to European values, such as 
democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights seems to 
increase and there has been a renewed recognition of the enduring 
importance of enlargement conditionality. In this way, the EU's policy on 
enlargement should be carefully managed in a sense that enlargement is 
linked with the process of internal consolidation, with the help and support 
of the old member states. 
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